This paper studies the potential benefits of collaborative forecasting (CF) partnerships in a supply chain that consists of a manufacturer and a retailer. To reflect the reality in production environments, we propose a scorecard that captures inventory considerations, production smoothing, and adherence-to-plans. We present a prescriptive convex-cost production planning model for the manufacturer, and a replenishment model for the retailer. We use our integrative reference model to study the potential benefits of CF partnerships. Overall, we find that the benefits of CF depend on the following key characteristics of the supply chain: The relative explanatory power of the supply chain partners, the supply side agility, and the internal service rate. CF is expected to bring high benefits to the supply chain when the manufacturer has the largest relative explanatory power. But quite disappointingly, in these cases a CF partnership does not appear to be valuable to the manufacturer. When the retailer is the dominant observer of market signals, CF typically yields a "win-win" outcome. In order to effectively act upon the information exchanged via CF, the supply side needs to be sufficiently agile. The benefits reported in this paper should be considered as conservative. This is because CF partnerships often bring better information, improved decision support technologies, as well as process improvement to the trading partners. Consequently, the supply side agility can be improved. If this indeed happens, the compound benefits of CF can be dramatically higher than our conservative estimates. Finally, we provide a qualitative discussion of the possible role of internal service rates in supply chains, either as planning parameters to improve performance, or as a mechanism for sharing the benefits of CF between the trading partners.
Introduction
Collaborative planning, forecasting and replenishment (CPFR) is a standard set of technologyenabled business processes that has been developed over the last decade by the Voluntary Interindustry Commerce Standard Association. CPFR's key objective is to provide trading partners with a roadmap for collaboration, via which they can integrate their demand and supply planning and execution processes (see CPFR 1999) . A CPFR partnership may include extensive sharing of information, and the use of such information to drive operational planning and product replenishment processes. By exchanging demand data, supply chain members can improve their product fulfillment levels, reduce their inventories and use their resources more efficiently and effectively.
The main objective of the present paper is to study the potential benefits that a supply chain can gain when its trading partners share advanced demand information -a practice to which we refer below as "collaborative forecasting" (CF). More specifically, our focus is on understanding the benefits of CF in decentralized supply chain configurations that include a retailer and a manufacturer. The manufacturer operates in an environment in which production smoothing, inventory levels, and the stability of the production schedule, are key metrics of concern (Graves et al., 1998) .
The consideration of the trade-offs characterizing production environments in the assessment of CPFR projects appears to be of substantial interest in practice; see, e.g., KJR Consulting (2002) and AMR Research (2001).
We develop a stylized reference model in which the supply chain members progressively collect information about the demand process. One key contribution of this paper lies in the adaptive production planning process it proposes for the manufacturer. The production strategy we devise is based on a class of policies that we derive by defining and solving a surrogate linear-quadratic Gaussian (LQG) problem. Another key contribution of this work is that it offers an optimization method for the retailer's inventory replenishment process, by taking into account the exact correlation pattern between the demand and the supply process (both of which are uncertain).
We use our model to study the potential benefits of CF partnerships, and the way in which the benefits naturally split between the trading partners. On average, CF leads to about 4% improvement in the overall supply chain scorecard performance. However, the benefits vary considerably across the different parameter combinations that were tested. We notice that three key characteristics of the supply chain affect the potential benefits of CF: The relative explanatory power of the supply chain partners, the supply side agility, and the internal service rate. These properties need to be well understood and taken into account when trading partners consider CF partnerships. A detailed summary of our key results and insights are found in the concluding section of this paper.
The paper is organized as follows. In §2 we propose a stylized reference model for the supply chain. In §3 we describe the retailer's replenishment policy class. In §4, we develop a class of production planning and execution policies for the manufacturer. In §5, we describe a method for determining the policy parameters for the trading partners based on their local incentives, and we present the way in which we evaluate the supply chain performance with and without CF. This enables us to study the potential benefits of CF and the way these benefits naturally split between the retailer and the manufacturer; see our numerical study in §6. We conclude the paper with a detailed summary of results in §7.
Literature Review
The management science literature has focused on several important aspects of CPFR. Aviv (2001) proposed a stylized reference model for quantifying the inventory and service performance of supply chains, in settings where forecasts are dynamically updated at more than one location in the system. Using this model, Aviv studied the potential benefits that the supply chain can gain through CF, as well as the benefits derived from the coordination of the replenishment processes across the chain ("collaborative replenishment" (CR)). Aviv (2002) compares traditional vendor-managed inventory (VMI) and CPFR programs in settings with different levels of inter-temporal correlation in the demand process. In both of these papers, Aviv's scope of analysis was limited to a discussion of the potential value of CPFR in a cooperative supply chain. The current paper bears some similarity to the above papers in the choice of the underlying descriptive demand model, and in the modeling of information exchange under CF. The key differences are in the consideration of the manufacturer's production environment, and the explicit modeling and discussion of the internal service performance.
A few recent research papers examine incentive issues in CF settings. Miyaoka (2003) studied a procurement transaction taking place between a retailer and a seller. The paper examined the conditions under which "Collaborative Forecasting Alignment" is achievable; in other words, the situation in which the trading partners have the right incentives to credibly share forecasts. Kurtulus and Toktay (2004) developed a game-theoretical model in which the supply chain partners can make investment choices that impact their forecasting capabilities. The authors identified important factors that affect individual and total forecasting effort and quality, and characterize conditions under which CF is sustainable. Other relevant papers that discuss self-interest behavior in uncertain environments characterized by asymmetric information include Cachon and Lariviere (2001) , Mishra et al. (2001) , and Ozer and Wei (2003) . We refer the reader to a more detailed literature review in a recent book chapter by Aviv (2004) .
To our knowledge, there is no work that studies CF in decentralized, information-rich environments, in which production capacities are explicitly modeled. Although researchers have studied the value of information sharing in capacity-constrained environments, they considered the upstream share of historical demand data (e.g., point-of-sale data) with the manufacturer; see, e.g., Aviv and Federgruen (1998) , Gavirneni et al. (1999) , and Simchi-Levi and Zhao (2003) . Our paper is different from these papers in that it considers information-rich environments, in which the share of information is not limited to the transfer of historical demand figures, but encompasses other "information signals". Generally speaking, information signals are streams of data that the supply chain members may be privy to on an ongoing basis. These may include promotion plans, changes in weather conditions, advanced information about demand -essentially, any sort of data, other than past demand realizations, that correlate with future demand. As argued in Aviv (2001 Aviv ( , 2002 , and Kurtulus and Toktay (2004) , the consideration of information signals is of significant importance for the understanding of CPFR's value proposition. Additionally, in the aforementioned papers, capacity is modeled as a fixed constraint. But in these models, a variable production path was not more costly than a stable one, and similarly, deviations from plans were not costly (thus, planning was not needed to be taken into account explicitly in their models).
Another approach to model the production environment is to consider metrics such as production smoothing, and plan stability (see, e.g., Sethi and Thompson, 2000 §6) . We adopt this approach, using a convex-cost smoothing formulation rather than a finite-capacity model in our analysis; we postpone the motivation and details to §2.2. Graves et al. (1998) proposes an elegant model of this type for production and inventory planning. Our paper is congruent with their work in the choice of the scorecard metrics (quadratic cost functions) for the manufacturer. However, there are some important differences. First, we allow for inter-temporal correlations in the demand process. Second, our models allow us to consider different levels of expectation for product availability in the manufacturer-to-retailer link of the supply chain -in our terms -the internal service rate. The assumption in Graves et al. is that the internal level of service is high enough so that the supply chain is "decoupled" with inventory (we shall discuss this issue in significant detail later on). The third difference is that our paper considers different levels of information asymmetries, and that it explicitly studies the value of CF.
A Stylized Supply Chain Model
In this section we present three elements of our reference model: (i) The specification of the coevolution of demand and information ( §2.1); (ii) A set of metrics, which we refer to as the supply chain scorecard ( §2.2); and (iii) The mode of operations in the supply chain, as well as the notion of "internal service rate" used later in this work ( §2.3).
Let us begin with a few preliminaries. We consider a retailer and a manufacturer that are responsible for producing and delivering a single product to the market. Let I r n denote the retailer's inventory position (= on hand, minus backlogs, plus all outstanding orders) at the beginning of period n, prior to order placement for that period. After placing the order for this period (denoted by A n ), it takes L periods for the manufacturer to deliver the product, given that no shortages occur at the manufacturer's level. We refer to L as the nominal delivery lead-time, or in shortthe lead time.
We now turn to the manufacturer's facility. Define q n,n to be the production batch size prescribed for period n, and suppose that, in addition, the manufacturer specifies a production plan for the immediate planning horizon of T periods. Specifically, let (q n,n+1 , q n,n+2 , . . . , q n,n+T ) be the production plan for periods n + 1 through n + T , set at the beginning of period n. Essentially, the manufacturer needs to determine the value of the column vector q n . = (q n,n , q n,n+1 , q n,n+2 , . . . , q n,n+T ) 0 at the beginning of period n. We postpone the treatment of this challenging planning process to §4. Let I m n denote the manufacturer's net inventory (= on hand, minus backlogs) at the beginning of period n, just after completing the production of items during period n − 1 (i.e., q n−1,n−1 ), and receiving the retailer's demand for that period. After the retailer places his order, the manufacturer ships to him as many units as possible to cover the current order plus all standing backorders.
Throughout this paper, we use the superscript or subscript notation 'r' and 'm' to refer to the retailer-specific and manufacturer-specific parameters, respectively.
A Reference Autoregressive Demand Model
We use a classic AR(1) process to represent the demand evolution. Let d n be the demand for the product, realized at the retailer's level, during period n, and suppose that it satisfies the dynamics
where {ε n } is a white-noise process, and 0 ≤ α < 1. The AR(1) time series pattern is commonly used in the inventory management literature; see, e.g., Kahn (1987) , Lee et al. (2000) , and Miyaoka and Hausman (2004) . By varying the level of α, one can capture a range of demand processes. For instance, α = 0 corresponds with the case of i.i.d. demands. The larger the value of α, the larger is the inter-temporal correlation between demands in different periods.
To capture the parties' ability to collect advanced demand information, we consider the following linear-regression explanatory model 1 :
This model reflects the fact that demand variations can be explained (statistically) in advance, by using information collected by the supply chain members. But it holds several properties that are worth emphasizing. First, is the fact that the information structure in the supply chain can be decentralized -this is an essential model feature for the study of CF. The superscript notation in the δ-values denotes which information is available to each individual member. The second property demonstrates the fact that advanced information is collected over time, for each specific random component ε n . This is reflected by the subscript index i in the explanatory variables:
for each member a of the supply chain (a ∈ {r, m}), δ a n,i is the information obtained about ε n during period n − i. The value τ represents the maximal time in advance from which the supply chain members can start collecting information about a specific ε-component. A third property of the model is that it enables us to consider cross-correlation between the individual members' information processes. For instance, if both members observe the exact same information during each period, the correlation between δ r n,i and δ m n,i would be perfect. For the sake of tractability and elegance of presentation, we assume that a correlation Cor ¡ δ r n,i , δ m n 0 ,i 0 ¢ = ρ applies only if n = n 0 and i = i 0 , and it is zero otherwise. Taking a more complex inter-temporal correlation pattern into account is certainly possible, but it makes the analysis, the experimental setup, and 1 Without loss of generality, our model works for models of the type:
the notation excessively cumbersome. Instead, we assume that statistical dependency between δ · n,i values and future demands is reasonably reflected via the inter-temporal correlation parameter α of the underlying auto-regressive time series (1) . We will use the term "market signals" when referring to the δ-values. Similarly to Aviv (2002) , we assume that δ a n,i ∼N(0, σ 2 a,i ), and ε 0 n ∼N(0, σ 2 0 ). The value of ε 0 n represents a part of the demand uncertainty that cannot be explained in advance at any time, even if one is privy to all information available to both members of the supply chain.
Finally, it is noteworthy to mention possible generalities and limitations of our models. Since our models primarily require linear state space evolution of demand (we shall discuss this later and in the Appendix), one can easily use our methodology to capture more complex time-series patterns, such as AR(n), ARMA(m,n), etc. The linear state space model can also be utilized to explore cyclical demand patterns associated, for example, with relatively stable and fixed product promotion or pricing patterns. Nonetheless, our demand model does not include any control variables. Specifically, our model does not capture coordinated operational and marketing processes in which the parties in the supply chain influence demand (e.g., via pricing, merchandising, promotions, etc.) on the basis of information. The latter subject is certainly a relevant research theme, yet it is beyond the scope of the current paper.
A Supply Chain Scorecard: Operational Efficiency and Service Metrics
In this section, we specify an operational performance scorecard for the supply chain. Our intent is to establish a balanced set of measures that capture the essence of the planning processes that take place in the supply chain. Let us begin with a few measures of operational efficiency. First, we consider the inventory holding costs at both levels of the supply chain: For the retailer, we define the cost function
where I r n is the net inventory 2 at the retailer's facility at the end of period n (this variable is different than the inventory position level I r n , defined above). The parameter h r is a per-period cost rate charged for each unit of the product kept on hand over a period. For the manufacturer, we define the metric
The next operational efficiency metric relates to the actual use of production capacity, and is 2 Net inventory is defined as inventory on hand, minus the cumulative backlogs. defined by
We use a convex function to represent an increasing marginal cost of production that results from fluctuations in production quantities. For example, convex production costs are often associated with congestion effects, commonly experienced in production lines with limited capacity (Lee and Billington 1993, Graves et al. 1998) . When the production quantities are highly variable, the manufacturer may need to reserve a high level of cushion capacity. The cost value C m P may also be associated with the need to use overtime or expedite inbound deliveries of raw materials, when large quantities of production are made during a specific period. As we shall see, the quadratic form is technically convenient to work with. The inclusion of the cost function C m P in our scorecard is made to provide an incentive for production smoothing (Kahn 1987) . For example, when the value of the parameter c P is very large compared to the value of h m , production will be made at a constant level, and mismatches between production and demand will be handled via inventory carrying or backordering.
Our third metric of operational efficiency relates to the adherence to production plans, a measure commonly used in industry (see, e.g., KJR Consulting 2002, and SCOR 6.1). The level of adherence to plans, relates to the degree to which production managers stick to plans specified in previous periods. Intuitively, changes made at the last moment are more troublesome than those made in advance. We define the vector u n . = (u n,0 , . . . , u n,T ) 0 , where
denotes the changes to the production plans made at the beginning of period n. We now specify an adherence-to-plan cost function of the following type:
for some positive values {c A,0 , . . . , c A,T }. For example, as explained in Graves et al. (1998) , an unstable production plan makes it harder for upstream members of the supply chain to predict demand. Changes in plans may also lead to cancellation or expedition of orders. The parameters {c A,· } can be used to describe the rigidity of the manufacturing planning process. For instance, the case {∞, 0, 0, . . .}, can describe a rolling-horizon manufacturing planning process, with the next period's production level being "frozen."
Clearly, while supply chain managers need to pay a considerable level of attention to operational efficiency, they cannot ignore their customers' expectations for product availability. In other words, efficiency must be balanced with service performance. To this end, we follow a standard approach in inventory theory, and introduce a shortage penalty cost function of the type
In other words, a per-period penalty cost of p r is charged for every unit of unsatisfied demand at the retail level.
In summary, to evaluate the collective performance of the supply chain, we consider the sum of the long-run average 3 values of the scorecard components
The Mode of Operations in the Supply Chain
Our current research interest is centered on the potential contribution of CF in decentralized supply chains. In such settings, each trading partner manages the operations in his own facility, and in accordance to local performance metrics. For example, we assume that of the aggregate score value described in (3), the retailer bears only the cost componentC r . =C r I,h +C r I,p . Driven by the objective of minimizingC r , the retailer attempts to balance the trade-off between carrying inventory and the risk of shortage. At the manufacturer's level, the score card specification deserves careful attention. Note that of the aggregate score value (3), the manufacturer bears the cost component
=C m I,h +C m P +C m A . Nonetheless, this scorecard component consists of efficiency-related metrics only. If the manufacturer's objective was merely to minimize the value ofC m , while ignoring product availability, the supply chain could possibly suffer. Indeed, in most practical settings, manufacturers cannot ignore the need to fulfill their direct customer's demand. To reflect this concern, we assume that for the purpose of production planning, the manufacturer uses a scorecard that takes into account the cost componentC m along with the following service-related metric. service component C r I,p , but in our model it is not considered a "real cost" from the overall supply chain's perspective. Rather, C r I,p is an internal metric, with p m expressing the extent to which a unit of shortage is perceived more negatively by the manufacturer than a unit held in inventory. In plain words, p m reflects the internal inconvenience the manufacturer faces as a result of shortages at his level. Later, we will refer to the ratio χ . = p m / (h m + p m ) as the internal service parameter.
In this paper, we consider χ to be exogenously given -a policy parameter that is set by "habit,"
or used by the manufacturer in accordance to an "industry standard." Using the same notational convention as above, we set the metricC m +C m I,p as a reference score value for the manufacturer's production planning process.
The assumption that the internal service rate is exogenously given, may not hold in some supply chain settings. For example, suppose that the supply chain trading partners have decided to adopt a centralized production and inventory planning process. Such a process can be either co-managed by the parties, or placed under the responsibility of one partner (e.g., in the form of a vendor-managed inventory partnership; see Aviv and Federgruen 1998) . Identifying an optimal centralized policy for the supply chain is a very challenging task, even in the case where no production efficiency considerations have to take place. To handle this challenge, the retailer and the manufacturer may decide to keep the policy structure we develop later in this paper. But rather than treating χ as exogenously given, the trading partners can proactively search for the value of χ under which the aggregate score valueC is minimized; see Aviv (2002 Aviv ( , 2003 for descriptions of such methods.
Internal service rates can also be driven by competitive behavior in the supply chain. For example, the rate χ may be set by either a powerful retailer or manufacturer. Alternatively, the value of χ may be a product of negotiation between the two parties. Another example of a competitive setting could be one in which the manufacturer bears part of the "penalties" that are charged for downstream shortages at the retail level. In other words, the scorecard valueC r I,p is shared by the manufacturer and the retailer (we refer the reader to Cachon and Zipkin (1997; §3) for a discussion of the rationale behind such a mechanism). When this is the case, the manufacturer can set the rate χ in a way that minimizes the efficiency-related costsC m plus his share ofC r I,p . Clearly, the manufacturer's choice of χ will impact product availability to the retailer, and thus the retailer will respond by determining his own inventory policy parameters. Equilibrium in the interaction between the manufacturer and the retailer can then be studied.
The Retailer's Replenishment Process
For the retailer's inventory management process, we adopt the forecasting-adaptive base-stock policy used in Aviv (2002) . Essentially, this is an installation-based base-stock policy (Axsater and Rosling 1993), adapted to the dynamic forecasting process. Such a policy prescribes for each period (n) an order of a size that brings the inventory position I r n as close as possible to a targetlevel, which we denote below by β r n . The target level β r n is split into two components: The first component is a minimum mean square error (MMSE) forecast of the lead-time demand
where H r n is the history of the retailer's observation of demands and market signals, collected until the beginning of period n. For example, under CF, the history H r n has to include the information conveyed by the manufacturer (see details in §5). The second component of the target level, is a fixed safety-stock γ r , and so β r n =D (L) n +γ r . Under certain conditions 4 of the statistical distribution of the demand, the retailer's orders satisfy:
Apparently, the retailer's policy depends on the internal service rate in the supply chain. For example, when χ is set to a significantly high level, we observe a technically pleasing property, named "decoupling". In other words, when setting up the inventory policy for the retailer, we do not need to be concerned about the specifics of the manufacturer's policy, since shortages are "rarely" experienced at his location. The only considerations that need to be taken into account are the nominal lead time (L) and the demand side uncertainty; see, e.g., Graves et al. (1998) and Graves (1999) . However, high χ-values, which make sense in some settings, can be considerably counter-productive to the manufacturer as well as to the supply chain as a whole. Indeed, Ettl et al.
(2000) compared the performance of a supply chain under two cases. In one case, the supply chain was set to be relatively-decoupled (internal performance objective of 95% no-stockout probability).
In the second case, they used their inventory optimization model. They found that the performance of the decoupled supply chain can be poorer by up to 20%. A similar observation was made by Graves (1996) , Cachon (1999) , and recently by Simchi-Levi and Zhao (2005).
When the supply chain is not decoupled (low-to-modest χ-values), the analytical treatment of the retailer's policy becomes considerably more complex. Under such conditions, the retailer must take into account the demand uncertainty as well as the supply-side performance. To handle this challenge, we study the statistical pattern of the co-evolution of the demand and supply processes at the retailer's facility. On the basis of this analysis, we propose a procedure for optimizing the retailer's scorecard performanceC r ; see §5.
A few alternative approaches to determine the retailer's replenishment orders are worth men- 
The Manufacturer's Planning Process
The development of a production planning policy for the manufacturer is a significantly challenging task. Hence, in order not to obscure the presentation below with excessive mathematical notation and complexity, we shall keep the technical background at the minimal necessary level. Appendix A provides the curious reader with the rigorous scientific details.
We begin the formal development of the manufacturer's decision problem, by specifying the state variables and the laws of dynamics in this setting. LetÃ n .
where μ is a (T + 1)-dimensional vector with all components equal to μ. Additionally, consider the information obtained by the manufacturer between the decision time in period n, and just a moment prior to the decision time in period n + 1 (i.e., after observing the retailer's order A n+1 ):
For technical convenience, we define Ψ m n with the cumulative values 
Under CF, the history H m n includes all information collected by the parties. Without CF, this history does not include the retailer's information (observed signals and demands). However, in the latter case, the manufacturer may still be able to infer the retailer's observations based on his own observations and the history of orders placed by the retailer. This statistical inference plays a key role in the manufacturer's dynamic planning process.
At the beginning of a decision period n, the manufacturer is equipped with three data components (I m n ,q n−1 , H m n ); in other words, the inventory status, the production plan specified in the previous period, and the history of demand information. This triplet evolves according to the laws of dynamics presented below. The manufacturer's inventory satisfies
The evolution of the production plan can be described through the decision variables u n as follows:
In a matrix form, we can write:
(see Appendix A for the description of M (T +1,1) ). The evolution of H m n is simply given by
We are now ready for a formal description of the manufacturer's dynamic decision problem. Let W * n (I m n ,q n−1 , H m n ) be the minimal total value of the costs C m +C m I,p over the horizon n, n+1, . . . , N, for some large value of N. This function should satisfy the recursive scheme
where the expectation in (9) is with respect to Ψ m n , conditioned on H m n . As expected, obtaining a solution to the dynamic program (9) is practically impossible, due to the complexity of its dynamics, the multi-dimensional structure of the state vector, and the presence of constraints on the decision variables. But fortunately, a nice property of the manufacturer's decision problem is that its dynamics maintain a partially-observable linear state-space form 5 . We establish this observation formally in Proposition 1 below. Define the (2τ
n − (L + 1) μ, X n´0 . In Proposition 5 in Appendix A, we show that the partially-observed state vector process {Y n } underlies the complete evolution of demand information available to the manufacturer. Consequently, we obtain the following important result:
Then, the process Z = {Z n } satisfies the dynamics
where {V z,n } is a white noise process with
(See the definitions of Θ z , Θ u , H z , and Σ z in Appendix A.)
The significance of this proposition is that the dynamic program (9) can be written in a more convenient form that will become useful in developing a production policy class in §4.1. For a given value of Ψ z,n−1 and u n , we can easily calculate the single-period scorecard value
, we can use the enlarged information state (Ψ z,n−1 , Ψ z,n−2 , . . .). Thus, problem (9) can be replaced by:
The resulting formulation is not necessarily simpler than (9) . However, in its new form, this dynamic program is reminiscent of a so-called linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG) control problem.
LQG problems have been studied extensively in the field of automatic control theory, and we shall utilize a few well-known analysis techniques from that research discipline.
An Adaptive LQG-Based Production Policy Class
In this section, we develop a heuristic policy class for the manufacturer. This sub-optimal policy is based on the solution of a dynamic optimization problem that we derive from (12) by making two changes. The first change, entitled "problem relaxation," is to ignore the non-negativity constraints on the production quantities. In the second change, called "cost approximation," we replace the
, whereĨ m n = I m n − γ m , for some parameter γ m . In order to maintain the flow of exposition, we postpone the discussion about how to determine the values of the parameters c I and γ m to §4.2. With these changes, our original problem is brought into a linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG) control problem form that we use as a surrogate planning model for the manufacturer. Below, we begin by introducing the LQG problem, and presenting its solution. We then describe how the optimal solution to the LQG problem is embedded into our heuristic production control policy. We conclude this section with a discussion about the appropriateness of the two model modifications.
The cost approximation step brings the single-period scorecard cost into the quadratic form
for appropriately defined matrices Q z and Q u (we note a slight change in the definition of the vector Z n , now includingĨ m n instead of I m n in its first component). Together with the problem relaxation, we obtain:
The surrogate LQG problem. Given the linear stochastic difference equation
where {V z,n } is a white noise vector process with
, by specifying the optimal control law
To solve the LQG problem, we first demonstrate the existence of stationary stabilizing controls, by verifying a few controllability properties; see Theorem 2 in Appendix A. We then take a sequence of technical steps that result in the following theorem.
Theorem 1
The optimal control policy for the LQG problem described above is comprised of two parts: At the beginning of each period n, the unbiased estimate of the state Y n is calculated. This conditional estimate is denoted byŶ n = E [Y n |H m n ]. Then, the production plan is determined via
(An algorithm for calculating the matrices Γ 1 and Γ 2 is described in Theorem 2, Appendix A).
Theorem 1 lays the foundation for a class of adaptive LQG-based production control policies. The emphasis on the term "class" is important. Recall that the surrogate LQG problem provides us with two degrees of freedom via the planning parameters c I and γ m , which specify the modified inventory cost function c I · (I m n − γ m ) 2 . In other words, the range of combinations {(c I , γ m ) : c I ≥ 0, γ m ∈ R} forms our policy class, from which we pick the best pair (c I , γ m ) that brings to the minimal average value of the overall scoreC m +C m I,p . Given a particular choice of the pair (c I , γ m ), the optimal matrices Γ 1 and Γ 2 are computed, and the heuristic policy works as
follows.
An Adaptive LQG-Based Heuristic Policy. At the beginning of period n, the updated sufficient statisticΨ m n−1 , and the previous estimateŶ n−1 , are used to calculate the estimatê
n ] (this value can be obtained, e.g., via a Kalman filtering algorithm; see Aviv 2003) . Then, using the valuesĨ m n ,q n−1 , andŶ n , a modification to the most recent production plan is determined through (13) . (The control rule may result in a value u n,0 that falls below −μ−q n−1,n , calling for a negative production quantity. To deal with a possible outcome of this type, one may decide to set q n,n to zero if the model suggests a negative level of production.)
The structure of our production policy is similar in nature to that of Graves et al. (1998) , in the sense that it applies a linear control on a vector of estimatesŶ n . In a nutshell, the class of policies they devise is one in which revisions to production plans are made according to a linear combination of most recent forecast updates. Their class of policies follows a structural assumption that in each period, the production plan is set so that the planned inventory at the end of the planning horizon is a given constant. They set the coefficients of the linear production function in a way that achieves a reasonable balance between inventory, production smoothing, and production stability (adherence-to-plans). We find the resemblance between the policy structures to be pleasing for several reasons. First, while our policy follows from an optimization of a surrogate dynamic programming model, it also has some practical appeal as it is consistent with the logic based on How effective do we expect our policy class to be? To address this question, we comment on the two problem modifications we make. The relaxation of the non-negativity constraints q n ≥ 0 appears to be of minor concern. Using a time series analysis of the production control path (of the LQG problem), we found that negative production quantities were seldom prescribed. The rate of occurrences of such events never exceeded 1% across our instances, and even when that happened, the magnitude of the (negative) production quantity was relatively small. Further discussions of this subject can be found, e.g., in Lee et al. (2000) , Aviv (2003) , and Miyaoka and Hausman (2004) .
To appreciate the appropriateness of the cost approximation, it is useful to understand the role of the two functional parameters, c I and γ m . By selecting c I , the manufacturer can balance the inventory costs with the production smoothing and stability costs. The planning parameter γ m is used as a lever to shift-up or shift-down the overall long-run profile of the inventory path. In other words, it is set as a safety-stock to accommodate the desired balance between inventory shortage and inventory holding costs at the manufacturer's level. ), as well as the relevant references therein). We believe that by enabling the manufacturer to choose these planning parameters, the resulting best-in-class policy should demonstrate a close-to-optimal scorecard performance.
Selecting the Best Policy in Class
The following proposition can be observed from our analysis of the LQG problem.
Proposition 2 Consider our adaptive LQG-based policy class. The long-run characteristics of the control paths {u n }, the production plans {q n }, and the "overshoot" net inventory path
, are independent of γ m . Consequently, the long-run expected average costsC m P andC m A are independent of γ m . Additionally, the matrices Γ 1 and Γ 2 in (13) are independent of γ m .
The result of this proposition is helpful in our analysis, since it justifies the use of a simple line search for identifying the optimal pair (c I , γ m ) within our policy class. Specifically, for any given value of c I , we use the two-phase algorithm implied by Theorem 2 for calculating the matrices Γ 1 and Γ 2 . We then derive a statistical characterization of the long-run distribution of {u n }, {q n }, and
, and use the results to approximate the scorecard componentsC m P andC m A . We also search for the best value of γ m (under the specific c I -value we consider) that minimizes the inventory/service cost componentC m I,h +C m I,p . The technical details are provided in Appendix A.
The Integrative Supply Chain Model
To complete the setup of our reference model, we need to describe the way in which the retailer's policy parameter γ r is determined. We also need to describe the method we use for comparing systems with and without CF.
The retailer's objective is to identify the value of γ r that minimizes the long-run average cost
To this end, we begin with a study of the process {I r n }. Observe that the value of I r n+L is equal to the retailer's inventory position at the beginning of period n (after the retailer has placed his order), excluding the cumulative shortage at the manufacturer level at the beginning of that period, minus the demand during periods n through n + L, inclusive.
Formally,
The latter formula captures the co-evolution of demand and supply, from the retailer's perspective, and it serves a vital role in the development of our stochastic search technique for finding the best choice of γ r . It is instructive to note that the right-hand-side of (14) includes random variables that are cross-correlated in a subtle way. In Appendix A, we present a method for computing the latter correlation pattern, and we explain the way in which one can obtain the long-run distribution of the process {I r n }. We then make two key observations: First, the long-run distribution of {I r n } depends on the policy parameters (c I , γ m ) chosen by the manufacturer. Recall that the choice of (c I , γ m ) is dependent on the internal service rate χ. Our second observation is that the long-run distribution of {I r n − γ r } is independent of γ r . This fact implies that the value of γ r that minimizes the retailer's score valueC r can be identified via a simple "newsvendor" algorithm; see Appendix A for the details.
As explained above, the choice of the manufacturer's policy parameters affects the supplyside performance for the retailer. However, due to the fact that the retailer's orders {A n } are independent of γ r , the manufacturer does not need to take γ r into account when selecting the policy parameters (c I , γ m ). Therefore, in order to assess the performance of the supply chain, we begin by choosing the policy for the manufacturer. This can be done for any arbitrary value of γ r (we used γ r = 0). Then, after identifying the policy parameters (c I , γ m ), we calculate the best response (i.e., γ r ) for the retailer. 
Analysis and Managerial Insights
In this section, we report on the key results obtained in our numerical study.
Experimental Setup and The Scope of Analysis
We constructed a group of 6, 480 parameter-combinations, to which we will refer as "instances."
Four parameters were kept constant across all instances: The mean value of the demand (μ = 10), the retailer's inventory cost parameters (p r = 19, h r = 1), and the manufacturer's inventory holding cost (h m = 1). We considered three possible values of internal service rates: χ ∈ {50%, 80%, 95%}.
For the demand and information evolution, we considered α ∈ {0, 0.2, 0.4}, and we grouped together the parameters . We examined a set of 6 combinations, as given in Table 1 . Common to all combinations, is that the variance of the error terms ε n (see (2)) is constant and equal to 2.5. For example, in the cases v INFO ∈ {I,II} only the retailer has access to advanced demand information, whereas in the cases v INFO ∈ {III,IV} the opposite is true.
In the other two cases v INFO ∈ {V,VI} the parties have equal explanatory power. The pattern ¡ A, Table 1 represents a situation in which signals about demand during a given future period become increasingly more informative as time gets closer to that period.
To reflect the operational characteristics of the manufacturer's environment, we consider the following sets of values:
Recall the c P reflects the manufacturer's inability to cope with production variability. Five different combinations of the parameters (T, c A,0 , . . . , c A,T ) were used, as described in Table 2 . The five Table 2 : A set of combinations for the vector (T, c A,0 , . . . , c A,T ), representing different levels of manufacturing planning rigidity (MPR). The string of values M = 10 is used to reflect the degree to which the manufacturer must "freeze" the production plan in advance.
combinations in the table correspond to different levels of flexibility in the production planning process, ranging from the first case in which adjustments to production plans are not costly, to the case in which production plans are "frozen" four periods in advance. We will refer to the different combinations by the term manufacturing planning rigidity (MPR), with the values ranging between 0 and 4 as indicated in the table. Collectively, the triplet (c P , MPR, L) is used to characterize the manufacturer's (or supply side) agility, where low values of this triplet are associated with better agility.
For each instance, we used the method outlined in §5 to estimate the long-run average cost valuesC r ,C m , andC, with and without CF. The overall scope of our analysis is confined to the study of the following questions: What is the overall potential benefit of CF to the supply chain?
And how do the overall benefits (or losses) of CF naturally split between the individual members?
Let's denote the average costs under CF, by '(CF)'; for instance,C r (CF) denotes the retailer's costs under a CF setting. The overall contribution of CF to the supply chain is then evaluated by
We note that in assessing the benefits η, we assume that no structural changes in the classes of operating policies discussed in § §3-5 are made after the start of the CF program. For example, if the trading partners decide to package CF together with (say) a vendor-managed inventory program, a model extension would be required in order to assess the new supply chain's performance (see, e.g., Aviv (2002) for such models).
The way that the benefits are shared between the retailer and the manufacturer is calculated by
, where η r +η m = η. We refer to the pair (η r , η m ) as the natural split of benefits. We use the term "natural" in order to emphasize that the individual benefits we report apply to the case in which the trading partners only exchange demand information under the CF partnerships. In other words, the partners do not engage in other possible contractual agreements, such as internal service-rate guarantees, monetary transfers, or price discounts.
The Potential Benefits of Collaborative Forecasting
We initially aggregated the 6,480 instances into 8 groups that represent various level of supply side agility: (i) low vs. high production variance costs (c P ∈ {0, 0.1, 0.2} and c P ∈ {0.5, 1, 2}, respectively); (ii) low vs. high manufacturing planning rigidity (MPR∈ {0, 1} and MPR∈ {2, 3, 4}, respectively); (iii) short vs. long lead times (L ∈ {1, 2} and L ∈ {3, 4}, respectively). For each one of the 8 groups, we further aggregated the data into three subgroups, depending on which party in the supply chain has a "stronger" (i.e., more explanatory) stream of advanced demand information (retailer, manufacturer, or "equal"). Table 3 provides the average values ofC, η, η r , and η m across all scenarios within each one of the 24 subgroups. Across all instances, the average benefits of CF isη = 4.1%, but the variability of η and the natural split of benefits (η r ,η m ) are highly dependent on some key system parameters. Indeed, it is the main purpose of this paper to shed light on these dependencies.
The table demonstrates that in order to assess the potential value of CF, one needs to understand the information structure in the supply chain. Particularly, which party has access to explanatory indicators of future demand, and how these information streams are correlated with each other.
We hence argue that a preliminary statistical study of the evolution of demand and information in the supply chain can serve an important role in the evaluation of CF partnerships. Table 3 suggests that the supply chain tends to gain more from CF when the manufacturer has the largest relative explanatory power. On average, the percentage benefits of CF across all instances with v INFO ∈ {III,IV} isη = 6.3%, versusη = 2.6% across the instances with v INFO ∈ {I,II}. Aviv (2002) explains the logic behind this observation in two ways: Typically, the ability to anticipate demand is more important downstream the channel than upstream; in other words, shortages at the retail level are more costly to the supply chain than shortages at the manufacturer level.
Additionally, note that the manufacturer can gain useful information about future demand just by observing the retailer's order stream; in other words, the manufacturer receives some (filtered) information about the retailer's stream of observed market data, even without CF.
The results in Table 3 also suggest that the benefits of CF tend to be larger when the supply side is more agile. The rationale behind this result has to do with the concept of actionable information;
i.e., information exchange is useful only if the trading partners can act upon it. If the manufacturer responds very slowly to information, the value of CF is minimal. A result in the same spirit is reported in Gavirneni et al. (1999) . They argue that when a manufacturer is constrained by tight fixed capacity limits, the share of historical demand values by the retailer has minimal value. Table   4 reports the average absolute benefits (C-C (CF)) and percentage-wise benefits of CF. The data are reported in three columns, corresponding to the three parameters that represent the supply side agility, (c P , MPR, L). For brevity of exposition, we do not report the full combinatorial study of the three parameters in Table 4 . But, for example, the two extreme agility levels associated with the subsets of instances with (c P = 0, MPR = 0, L = 1) and (c P = 2, MPR = 4, L = 4) correspond with average benefits ofη = 14.5% and 1.3%, respectively. Consequently, we expect agile supply chains to report on larger benefits from CF, than those reported by chains with limited supply side agility. Thus, when benchmarking CF practices, one should collect and use agility performance metrics in order to intelligently interpret data.
Finally, over the range of values we considered for the inter-temporal correlation α, we found that the average benefits of CF tend to increase with α, but in a modest way. Specifically, we observed thatη = 3.9%, 4.1%, 4.4%, for α = 0, 0.2, 0.4, respectively.
Collaborative Forecasting and Supply Chain Agility Improvement
Our results suggest that although supply side agility improvement and CF appear to be complementary, the expected value of this complementarity is typically small compared to the benefits that can be gained from agility improvement. This observation has two ramifications. First, CF
should not be the main driver for agility improvement; see an illustrative example in Figure 1 below.
Second, CF partnerships often bring better information, improved decision support technologies, as well as process improvement to the trading partners. Consequently, the supply side agility can be improved. If this indeed happens, the compound benefits of CF can be dramatically higher than those reported above in Table 3 . A similar observation was made by Cachon and Fisher (2000): "...
implementing information technology to accelerate and smooth the physical flow of goods through a supply chain is significantly more valuable than using information technology to expand the flow of information." 
The Natural Split of the Benefits
Looking back at Table 3 , we see that at times, the manufacturer is expected to end up with a loss as a result of CF. In fact, the results appear to be somewhat discouraging, since in most cases where we expect the potential benefits of CF to be the highest for the supply chain, the partnership does not appear to be valuable to the manufacturer. How does a natural split of benefits lead to a loss for the manufacturer? We argue that when the manufacturer collects highly-explanatory demand information in advance, and the retailer does not have access to such information, the manufacturer can predict the future retailer's orders quite well. Clearly, under such conditions, the manufacturer can handle the production process in a relatively efficient way. Now, when the manufacturer begins The value of this metric is given by the following expressions.
Clearly, the increase in uncertainty is counter-productive to the manufacturer's own performance, and we expect the negative consequences to be particularly large when the internal service rate in the supply chain is high. Indeed, among our instances with v INFO ∈ {III,IV}, the average values of η m were −3.5%, −8.6%, and −14.1% for χ = 50%, 80%, and 95%, respectively. In a recent paper, Zhang and Zhao (2004) report on a similar observation, and discuss conditions under which information sharing decreases the manufacturer's ability to predict demand.
In addition to the uncertainty metric, one may wish to consider the measure V ar (A · ), denoting the long-run variability of the retailer's orders process {A n }. When α = 0, it can be shown that V ar (A · ) is equal to the long-run variability of the demand process {d n }, both with and without CF. But, with a positive inter-temporal correlation taking place, we generally expect to have
; in other words, variability of demand propagates upstream the supply chain -a phenomenon well-known as the "bullwhip effect."
Proposition 4 (The Impact of CF on Variability Propagation) Suppose that the manufacturer is the only observer of market signals (i.e., σ r,· = 0), and consider the variability measure V ar (A · ). This metric is given by the following expressions (the inequality holds with α ≥ 0).
The proposition demonstrates that sharing information downstream the supply chain mitigates the level of variability propagation. This can provide a possible explanation for our observation that the losses to the manufacturer (under the natural split of gains) were lower under larger α-values.
Among our instances with v INFO ∈ {III,IV}, the average values of η m were −9.5%, −8.9%, and −7.9% for α = 0, 0.2, and 0.4, respectively. Additionally, we expect that for a manufacturer that works in an inflexible production environment (reflected by high c P and MP R values), a reduction in variability can be particularly beneficial. But to put Propositions 3 and 4 in the appropriate perspective, our results suggest that the increase in uncertainty has a deeper negative impact on the manufacturer's performance, than the benefits he can gain as a result of the reduced order variability.
We now turn our attention to the cases in which the retailer is the sole observer of the market signals (instances with v INFO ∈ {I,II}). Figure 2 below presents the average values of (η r , η m ) as a function of the delivery lead time 6 L and the internal service rate χ.
Figure 2:
The average values of (η r , η m ) across all instances with v INFO ∈ {I,II}, as a function of the lead time L (separate lines) and the internal service rate χ (marked on each line; small, medium, and large markers correspond with χ = 50%, 80%, and 95%, respectively).
When the retailer shares information upstream, it makes sense that the manufacturer will end up with a gain due to his improved ability to anticipate demand. Yet, for the retailer, the reward is not necessarily clear. For instance, if the internal service rate is high, the retailer may feel that by enabling the manufacturer to reduce his level of uncertainty, the manufacturer will end up lowering his levels of safety stock inventory. This, in turn, might adversely affect the order-fulfillment process and lead to a negative impact on the retailer's performance. Nevertheless, as Figure 2 suggests, we notice that when the retailer is the dominant observer of market signals (say σ m,· = 0), CF is expected to yield a "win-win" outcome (i.e., η r , η m ≥ 0).
In practical terms, our observations suggest that when σ m,· = 0, we expect the industry experience with CF partnerships to be desirable when lead times are short and the manufacturers highly care about service performance. But in such cases, the retailers may not feel that CF is an attractive investment, because their supply experience with the manufacturer is already satisfying in its current state. If the manufacturers are not highly concerned about fulfillment rates, it may be beneficial for the retailers to enter into CF. However, the benefits to the manufacturers are then questionable. In the range of moderate χ-values, the gains are split more evenly.
The Internal Service Rate -A Qualitative Discussion
Recall that in modeling the manufacturer's production policy, we assume that the internal service rate χ is exogenously given. Furthermore, when we evaluate the potential benefits of CF (i.e., the values of η r , η m , and η), we assume that the value of χ is kept at the same level before and after the implementation of CF. The objective of this section is to discuss possible ways in which the internal service rate can be utilized to improve the supply chain performance, and/or be used as a mechanism to make CF partnerships more appealing to both individual parties. Let us begin with a simple illustration provided in Example 1 below. The illustration in this example raises a normative question of the following type. In what way can the trading partners proactively set the internal service rate χ so as to maximize their overall supply chain performance? As can be seen in Figure 3 , the dependency of the overall supply chain performance on χ is in itself dependent on whether CF is implemented or not. For instance, in the base case (no CF) in the figure, the supply chain's performance is close-to-optimal for any value of χ. This is because the manufacturer observes the demand a sufficient amount of time in advance, and hence he can predict the retailer's orders with a high level of accuracy.
Therefore, the manufacturer does not need to compromise operational efficiency under any χ value.
Moreover, since the manufacturer modeled in this example is highly agile, he bears no significant operational variability burden or planning adjustment costs. In contrast to the base case, when CF is implemented, the overall supply chain performance varies substantially with χ. As can be seen in Figure 3 , it is particularly negative for the supply chain (and for the manufacturer) to set the internal service rate to a high level; see our explanation in §6.4. Interestingly, the illustration in Example 1 demonstrates that the supply chain as a whole may achieve it's largest benefits when the manufacturer virtually serves as a "postman." In other words, it would be better for the supply chain if the manufacturer not only avoids maintaining a high fulfillment rate at his facility, but if he practically eliminates all safety-stock inventories. Specifically, production is only made to meet the retailer's order that will surely take place at the beginning of the next period. Miyaoka and Hausman (2004) propose that the supply chain consider the use of "stale" (i.e., old) forecasts for inventory planning at the retailer's level. This is not equivalent to modifying the internal service rate χ, but it is designed to achieve a similar effect -that is -making the manufacturer less vulnerable to increased demand uncertainty. One may argue that a modification of χ makes more sense, since it does not tie the hands of the retailer in matching supply with demand, but rather it relieves the manufacturer from an unnecessary burden of providing high levels of service to the retailer.
The lesson we take from Example 1 is that CF partnerships can benefit from a careful examination and re-setting of "traditional" internal service rate expectations. Revising the internal service rate standards in the supply chain may not only result in an increase of the benefits of CF to the supply chain, but also help reposition an unattractive CF partnership (e.g., from the perspective of the manufacturer) closer to a "win-win" outcome.
Our next illustration examines a case in which the retailer is the only observer of market signals. For instance, if χ is set to 50%, the benefits of CF to the supply chain would be about 16%, with a natural split of 4% to the manufacturer and 12% to the retailer. However, it is interesting to consider the base case (no CF) with a relatively high level of internal service; say, χ = 95%.
Here, the supply chain can gain about 14%, with a natural split of 13% to the manufacturer and 1% to the retailer. Now, recall that the retailer is the only observer of market signals, and it is hence questionable whether he would find a CF program attractive enough to warrant his participation. Let's take this example one step further. Suppose that the trading partners have decided to combine CF with a simultaneous reduction of the service rate from χ = 95% to χ = 50%.
In this case, the overall benefits to the supply chain would be an impressive 31%, but the natural split of benefits would be 46% to the manufacturer and −15% to the retailer. Therefore, without an additional benefit-sharing mechanism in place, the supply chain members may forego the high potential benefits.
Finally, we note that under the conditions of Examples 1 and 2, it happens to be that the optimal levels of the internal service rates are low (χ ∈ [0%, 60%] works reasonably well). However, it is instructive to note that this is not the case in general! For example, one key factor that impacts the optimal level of χ is the echelon inventory cost at the retailer's level, given by the difference h r − h m . In the examples above, h r = h m = 1, and so the echelon inventory costs are zero. As can be expected, when h r − h m is large, it is generally optimal to position some inventory upstream at the manufacturer's site, so long as the lead time is not too large (see, e.g., Clark and we changed the levels of the agility parameters L, MPR, and c P . The most noticeable difference is that the optimal value of χ for the supply chain tends to be higher when the manufacturer is less agile (but it was generally optimal to set χ to a rate lower than 50%).
Conclusions
This paper proposes a reference model for studying the potential benefits of collaborative forecasting (CF) in a decentralized supply chain consisting of a retailer and a manufacturer. We utilize a descriptive model of an information-rich environment in which the supply chain members progressively collect information about the demand process. The demand itself exhibits inter-temporal correlation. To reflect the reality in the manufacturer's production environment, we propose a set of metrics that capture inventory considerations, production smoothing, and adherence-to-plans.
Consequently, one of the main challenges of this paper is to develop an adaptive production planning process for the manufacturer that establishes an appropriate balance between the various metrics of concern. The production rule we devise is based on a class of policies that we derive by defining and solving a surrogate linear-quadratic Gaussian (LQG) problem. For the retailer, we propose a forecasting-adaptive inventory replenishment policy class, and an optimization technique to identify the best policy in class. To this end, we employ a simulation-based procedure that accounts for the precise correlation between the (uncertain) demand and supply processes.
Using our reference model, we conducted a numerical analysis to study the potential benefits of CF partnerships. On average, CF leads to about 4% improvement of the overall supply chain scorecard performance. However, the benefits vary considerably across the different parameter combinations we tested. We noticed that three key characteristics of the supply chain affect the potential benefits of CF: The relative explanatory power of the supply chain partners, the supply side agility, and the internal service rate. 7 Note that the costs under CF in Examples 1 and 2 are the same.
A preliminary statistical study of the co-evolution of demand and information in the supply chain should serve an important role in the evaluation of CF partnerships. For example, we find that the supply chain tends to gain more from CF when the manufacturer has the largest relative explanatory power. In our supply chain management classes, we usually argue that in order to assess the value of CF, managers need to agree on a reference demand model. A reference demand model is one that specifies the dependency of the demand process on information that the parties can individually or collectively observe in the market. Such a model can be highly quantitative or not, depending on the skills and data available to the CF assessment team, but it should play a key role in an intelligent estimation of the value of CF. This point is well-received by our graduate business students.
We find that the benefits of CF tend to be large when the supply side is agile. The rationale behind this result has to do with the concept of actionable information; i.e., information exchange is useful only if the trading partners can act upon it. If the manufacturer responds very slowly to information, the value of CF is minimal. For example, the two extreme agility levels we examine correspond with average benefits of 14.5% (high level of agility) and 1.3% (low level of agility).
Consequently, we expect agile supply chains to report larger benefits from CF than those with more limited agility. This result highlights an important lesson for managers: When benchmarking CF practices, one should define and measure agility performance metrics, and incorporate them into the data analysis.
Our results also suggest that although supply side agility improvement and CF appear to be complementary, the expected value of this complementarity is typically small compared to the benefits that can be gained from agility improvement. This brings the following important point. The benefits reported in this paper should be considered as conservative. This is because CF partnerships often bring better information, improved decision support technologies, as well as process improvement to the trading partners. Consequently, the supply side agility can be improved. If this indeed happens, the compound benefits of CF can be dramatically higher than our conservative estimates.
In addition to the analysis of the overall potential contribution of CF to the supply chain, we examine the way in which the benefits of CF naturally split between the trading partners (see definition in §6.1). The results appear to be somewhat discouraging, since in most cases where we expect the potential benefits of CF to be highest for the supply chain, the partnership does not appear to be valuable to the manufacturer. We show that when the manufacturer has the largest explanatory power, a CF program has a negative impact on his ability to anticipate future retailer's orders. We also show that when demand is correlated across time, CF can mitigate the bullwhip phenomenon; in other words, it leads to lower fluctuations (variability) in the retailer's order stream. Nonetheless, we observe that the increase in uncertainty has a deeper negative impact on the manufacturer's performance, than the benefits he can gain as a result of the reduced order variability. When the retailer is the dominant observer of market signals, CF typically yields a "win-win" outcome. The way in which the overall benefits are split between the retailer and the manufacturer is highly dependent on the value of the internal service rate. A lesson that we take from these results is that, often, information exchange alone may not naturally lead to a beneficial outcome to both partners. In such cases, it is important to complement the partnership with a benefit-sharing agreement of some sort.
Our results on the benefits of CF hold with the following qualifications. First, we consider the case of decentralized supply chains, in which each trading partner manages the operations in his own facility, and in accordance to local performance metrics. This is assumed to hold both with and without CF. We further assume that no structural changes in the classes of operating policies are made after the start of a CF program. Second, we use the internal service rate mechanism to drive a balance (not necessarily optimal) between production efficiency and product availability at the manufacturer's facility. We consider the case in which the internal service rates are exogenously given, reflecting situations in which the manufacturer sets them by "habit" or according to an "industry standard." Nonetheless, we demonstrate, via a couple of illustrations ( §6.5), the way in which our models are readily available to search for the best value of the internal service rates that lead to the best supply chain performance. Indeed, using these illustrations, we suggest that when implementing CF, the trading partners should pay careful attention to the internal service rates. A thoughtful determination of the internal service rates may lead to better supply chain performance, as well as a sustainable CF partnership (i.e., yielding an ongoing "win-win" outcome). 
Under the specification of the model (1)- (2), it is easy to see that X n = F X n−1 +V n , where Recall that Ψ r n is observed after the retailer has made his procurement decision for period n. Consequently, we can write: 
The Retailer's Forecasting Process ( §3)
In order for the retailer to calculate the lead time demand estimate,X n . = E [X n |H r n ] is generated:
With this estimate, we get:
The expression on the right-hand-side of (16) is based on the linear state space representation (15). Specifically, H r X n−1 is equal to the value of Ψ r n−1 , and κ r is the (τ + 1) × 1 vector
The manufacturer's forecasting process ( §4)
The following proposition establishes that from the manufacturer's standpoint, the demand and information processes follow a linear state space evolution of the type (15).
Proposition 5
The following linear state space model represents the co-evolution of demand and information at the manufacturer's level:
where
is a white noise process with E
Proof. Equation (18) follows directly from (15) and (16) . Next, by plugging (16) into (5), we get A n+1 = κ r H r X n − κ r H r X n−1 + e (τ +1,1) H r X n . This establishes (19) . Equation (20) Proof of Proposition 1. Let
The first rows of the matrices Θ z , Θ u , and V z,n follow from (6), (19) , (20) , and (7). The second rows follow from (7), and the third rows reflect the dynamics (18) . The observation equation Ψ z,n = H z Z n + Θ u u n holds with
The first two rows of the equation Ψ z,n = H z Z n + Θ u u n follow directly from the dynamics of the process {Z n }. The third row is simply (19) . Finally, from the definitions of V z,n andṼ n+1 , it is easily seen that
Under the inventory cost approximation, the score for period n is equal to Z 0 n Q z Z n + u 0 n Q u u n , where
By further relaxing the non-negativity constraints, we obtain a surrogate LQG problem that corresponds with the linear stochastic difference equations Z * n+1 = Θ z Z * n + Θ u u n + V z,n , and Ψ * z,n = H z Z * n . This set of dynamics and observation equations is slightly different than that presented in the body of the paper, in which we set Ψ * z,n 
subject to the fully-observable and deterministic dynamics
The latter presentation (21)- (22) is called a controllability canonical form (the values of the matrices Q z,11 , Θ u,1 , Θ z,11 , and Θ z,12 represent straightforward parts of the corresponding matrices Q z , Θ u , and Θ z .). The solution to this problem is provided in the following theorem.
Theorem 2 Let P 1 be the fixed point of the operator:
and let P 2 be the fixed point of the operator:
i PF Then, the optimal control for the fully-observable, deterministic LQG problem is given by
, and
roof. The theorem follows from the four properties listed below; see, e.g., Anderson et al. (1996) .
(i) The pair (Θ z,11 , Θ u,1 ) is controllable. This is proven by showing that in the LQG problem (21)- (22), the state ³Ĩ n ,q n−1´c an be brought to zero from any initial state, within T + 2 periods. In fact, for an initial state
The matrices Q z,11 and Q u are positive semi-definite and positive definite, respectively. (iii) The pair (Θ z,11 , S) is observable, where S is a matrix that satisfies SS 0 = Q z,11 . To show this, we set S to be the same matrix as Q z,11 , but with √ c I and √ c P entries, instead of the c I and c P entries, respectively. We then show that the matrix
¢ T +1 S 0 i has a rank T + 2; we omit the details. Hence, the pair ¡ Θ 0 z,11 , S 0 ¢ is controllable, and hence (Θ z,11 , S) is observable. (iv) The eigenvalues ofF have absolute values that are strictly less than one; see Aviv (2002) . ¤ Thm. 2 shows that the first part of the optimal solution to the fully-observable deterministic LQG problem, is determined by solving a production control problem that completely ignores the information process Y ; this is the part −Γ 1 ³Ĩ m n ,q n−1´0 . The information state Y n is taken into account in the second linear term, −Γ 2 Y n , but not in a trivial way. Indeed, the operator Λ 2 is set to take into account the inventory and capacity management scorecard as well as the overall dynamics of the state process Z * , and hence it is dependent on P 1 , the fixed point of Λ 1 .
We use the result of theorem 2 to develop the optimal control of our original stochastic and partiallyobservable production problem; see Theorem 1 in §4.1. The details are provided in the following proof.
Proof of Theorem 1. Control theory tells us that when we deal with the non-deterministic dynamics Z * n+1 = Θ z Z * n +Θ u u n +V z,n , instead of its deterministic associate (22) , the optimal control rule remains the same as in Theorem 2 (see, e.g., Bertsekas 1995) . Furthermore, the consideration of the observation equation Ψ * z,n = H z Z * n , does not complicate the problem in a significant way. By the separation principle (see, ibid.),
we can decouple the LQG problem into two tasks. The first task is to calculate the conditional expectation of the current state Z * n given all history of up-to-date information available to the manufacturer. Note that the part ³Ĩ m n ,q n−1´0 of Z * n is completely observable, and hence we only need to compute the estimates The following result will be useful in our analysis.
Proposition 6 Define the (T + 4τ + 6)-dimensional column vector J n . = ³³Ĩ m n ,q n−1´, Y n , Y n −Ŷ n´0 , and note that it satisfies the vector auto-regressive dynamics:
where Proof. We use (10) and the control rule (13) to verify the first rows of F J and V J,n . The second rows represent the dynamics (18) . Finally, the third rows follow from (18) and from the Kalman filter equation
The value of Σ J , the covariance matrix of the multivariate white noise process {V J,n } can be straightforwardly obtained by using ΣṼ . Furthermore, formulae for approximatingC m I,h andC m I,p are readily available.
The value ofC m P is approximated by c P · W J, (2, 2) , since the production quantity q n,0 appears in the second element of the corresponding vector, J n+1 . Also, in view of the fact that u n = (−Γ 1 , −Γ 2 , Γ 2 ) J n , we approximateC m A by P T j=0 c A,j
. The above calculations can be performed along a simple line search on c I , with the optimal level of the latter be chosen so as to minimize the approximated long-run average value ofC m +C m I,p .
The Selection of the Retailer's Policy Parameter γ r ( §5)
In order to identify the optimal value of γ r , we propose a stochastic search algorithm. The following results lay the foundation for our optimization method. With a bit of algebra, we show that
For simplicity of exposition, let's rewrite I r n+L = ξ 1,n + γ r − max ³ −γ m −Ĩ m n , 0´− ξ 2,n , with the ξ-variables corresponding with the respective components on the right-hand-side of (26) . Our algorithm now follows: Using a simple simulation routine, we generate a long series (of size N) of correlated pairs associated with the couple of random variables ³ ξ 2 − ξ 1 , −Ĩ m n´. Denote this stream by {(ω n,1 , ω n,2 )} N n=1 , and define ω n . = ω n,1 + max (ω n,2 − γ m , 0). Essentially, the retailer's faces a "newsvendor"-type problem, and so it is optimal to pick the smallest value of γ r such that −p r + (h r + p r ) · P N n=1 C r I (γ r − ω n ) for the chosen value of γ r . Fortunately, the evolution of the state vector J n , described in (24) , is readily available to produce the correlation between the random variables ξ 1,n andĨ m n . Both of these variables are independent of the third random variable ξ 2,n . In particular, ξ 1,· = For the case of CF, the algebra is more tedious, but a shortcut can be taken by redefining the set of matrices for the special case of CF according to the lines of Aviv (2002) : The interested reader can use their notation to show that A n+1 = G * F L+2 * X * ,n−1 +G * ³ P L+1 l=0 F l * ´W * ,n +μ. The vectors X * ,n−1 and W * ,n are statistically independent, with X * ,n−1 fully observable through the history of information accumulated up to the beginning of period n (after the retailer has placed his order), whereas the W * ,n is completely unobservable by that time. Furthermore, it can be shown that V ar (X * ,· ) = diag . ¤
